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In-work benefits (IWBs) are important in ‘making work pay’ for many low-income families. We 
consider the adequacy of Family Income Supplement (FIS) for Irish lone parents transitioning 
from social protection to paid employment. Drawing on interviews with lone parents and with 
stakeholders, FIS enables some lone parents to meet basic needs and move towards financial 
independence, there were also difficulties, and many are financially better off remaining on social 
protection. There is a need, either for significant changes or for the introduction of an alternative 
IWB to meet the requirements of lone parents transitioning from social protection to ensure that 
they are not living in poverty.
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Introduction
This paper examines the effectiveness of Ireland’s in-work benefit (IWB), Family 
Income Supplement (FIS)1 in its current form to provide income adequacy for lone 
parents making the transition from social protection to paid employment. Our analysis 
takes place in the context of a significant policy change introduced in 2013, whereby 
the age threshold of the youngest child for receipt of the One Parent Family Payment 
(OFP) was reduced from 18 to 7. The OFP is a payment for those under 66 who 
are bringing children up without the support of a partner. Recipients must meet 
certain conditions and satisfy a means test. The OFP has an income disregard which 
allows recipients to earn up to €130 per week without an effect on payment. For 
some transitioning from OFP after their youngest child reaches 7 FIS enables lone 
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parents to satisfy the mandatory work criteria while facilitating their caring duties, 
however, FIS in its current form is not suitable for all lone parents as the findings in 
this paper highlight. While the current system of Irish social protection has a number 
of means to support income adequacy for low income families this paper focuses 
specifically on FIS which is regarded as the primary IWB in Ireland. Drawing on 
data from two studies conducted by the authors (Millar and Crosse, 2016; Gray and 
Rooney, 2018), funded by the Department of Social Protection (DSP) and the Irish 
Research Council (IRC) we examine how effective FIS is as an IWB to ensure that 
lone parents in employment are not living in poverty. 
We review the international literature on IWB’s in labour market activation policies 
and discuss activation of lone parents in Ireland, including the significance of FIS in 
‘making work pay’. We then draw on interviews with lone parents in receipt of FIS 
and with stakeholders who engage with lone parents to highlight the benefits and 
challenges associated with the payment. While FIS enabled lone parents to meet basic 
needs and move towards a greater level of financial independence, there were also 
difficulties such as cumbersome paperwork, challenges arising from the annual review, 
stigma, a lack of awareness of FIS among some lone parents and the unsuitability 
of FIS for seasonal workers. However, stakeholders and some lone-parent recipients 
expressed an overriding concern that many lone parents are financially better off 
remaining on social protection. 
While IWB’s are crucial in ‘making work pay’ for lone parents transitioning to 
employment, only 6.9 per cent of those who transitioned since 2013 are in receipt 
of FIS (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2017). Of the approximately 25,500 recipients who 
exited OFP in 2015, 13,600 (54 per cent) moved to Jobseekers Transition Payment 
(JST) an out of work benefit for those with children aged 7 to 14, 2,500 (10 per cent) 
to Jobseekers Allowance (JA) an out of work benefit for all unemployed individuals 
and 8,100 (32 per cent) to FIS (Indecon, 2017). A recent DSP commissioned survey 
reports that 53 per cent of lone parents surveyed reported being financially worse off 
since the reforms and 63 per cent of those in full-time employment cannot afford 
three or more items on the deprivation list (Indecon, 2017). In 2017, approximately 
27,000 lone parents were in receipt of FIS (Indecon, 2017). Our analysis suggests 
some reasons why comparatively few lone parents have transitioned to FIS and 
indicates that there is a need, either for significant changes to the current system, or 
for the introduction of an alternative IWB to meet the requirements of lone parents 
transitioning from OFP to ensure that they are not living in poverty
The role of in-work benefits in lone-parent labour market 
activation
Welfare-to-work policies involve elements of compulsion and support to ensure 
that individuals make the transition to paid employment. Rowlingson and Millar 
(2002) identify three types of policies to support lone parents into employment: the 
introduction of strict work requirements or participation in activation programmes; 
changes to welfare payments and taxes to improve the financial incentive to work; and 
the provision of childcare services or subsidies. How each of these elements has been 
implemented varies from country to country. Financial supports and subsidies, such 
as grants, loans, tax credits and IWBs form an important element in supporting lone 
parents into employment (Rowlingson and Millar, 2002). IWBs are social protection 
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payments for employees and are a core policy instrument in ‘making work pay’ for 
low-paid workers as opposed to being financially better off on social protection. 
Research suggests that IWBs are a successful way to improve quality of life and 
reduce child poverty in lone-parent families (Brewer et al, 2012; Carnochan et al, 
2005). Dale et al (2010) describe IWBs as politically attractive because they seem to 
fulfil both employment and distributional goals at the same time and take a variety of 
forms, such as tax credits, wage-related transfers or lump-sum payments; the choice 
of which to use will depend on the target group involved. Conventional IWBs are 
income tested, available to all workers on a low-income, and tend to have no time 
limit. Ray et al (2007) report on a qualitative evaluation of In-Work Credit (IWC).2 
Lone parents interviewed were positive about IWC, using it for day-to-day living 
expenses. It was very important to those who had debts; high childcare, housing or 
transport costs; and those with low or unreliable incomes. 
Casebourne et al (2010) explored the impact of the IWC on lone parents’ retention 
and advancement in paid employment. Respondents reported IWC as being effective 
in supporting them by ensuring a reliable weekly income while they adapted to 
budgeting on a monthly wage and by offering additional income. Moreover, the 
expiration of their IWC payment did not lead to lone parents leaving employment: 
most were still in work three to seven months later, usually in the same job. 
In relation to labour market activation tax credits have been introduced to make 
work more financially attractive than benefits and improve the income adequacy of 
low income families and therefore reduce poverty levels among the working poor. 
Canada, the UK and the USA have been at the forefront in the introduction of 
such tax measures where they are viewed as important policy instruments to make 
work pay. In recent years many countries have introduced tax credits as part of more 
widespread tax reforms including France, the Netherlands, Finland, Germany and 
Belgium. Much of this has been in response to the European Employment Strategy 
(2003) ‘making work pay’ guidelines (Verbist et al, 2007). Millar (2008) describes tax 
credits as a ‘major innovation’ in UK social protection policy by bringing the tax 
system directly into the role of assessing and delivering social protection bringing 
many more families into the domain of ‘income-tested support’. Tax credits form a 
substantial addition to the wages of low-paid individuals and they make part-time 
work a financial option for many lone parents. Millar (2011) argues that a system based 
on a fixed tax credit payment for a set period of time would negate the difficulties 
families experience as it would provide stability and security of payment, but this 
would also remove flexibility to deal with changing circumstances. 
A meta-analysis of 29 welfare reform initiatives in the US reports two primary 
findings: programmes that used mixed initial activities with a strong emphasis on 
employment had the best results, and only those programmes that included financial 
supports such as the Earned Income Tax Credit to those who entered employment 
led to increases in the income of participants (Bloom and Michalopoulos, 2001, cited 
in Carnochan et al, 2005). In Canada, the introduction of a wage subsidy for lone 
parents to take up full-time employment increased the length of time parents remained 
off social assistance and decreased the time spent on social assistance (Lacroix and 
Brouillette, 2011). In New Zealand, labour market activation policies have facilitated 
some to improve their income through paid work, but in a complex way. Income 
adequacy and security were not stable and engaging in paid work meant that lone 
parents were dependent on a combination of income sources. For most lone mothers, 
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work alone did not pay; rather, the IWB, tax credits and child support, combined 
with wages, provided income adequacy (Patterson, 2008). Individual motivation to 
work among lone parents is related to the importance attached to caring as opposed 
to work and the problems anticipated in combining both (Breitkreuz et al, 2010; 
Haux, 2010; McMullin et al, 2002). Lone mothers place a high value on care, and 
their comprehension of what good mothering involves determines how they think 
about family life and employment (Manoogian et al, 2015; Henderson et al, 2005). 
IWBs have the potential to facilitate lone parents in combining paid employment 
with care by providing income adequacy. 
FIS and Lone parents Employment in Ireland
In this section, we introduce the changes to social protection policy for Irish lone 
parents and present an overview of OFP, FIS and the Back to Work Family Dividend 
(BTWFD).  The EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions (CSO, 2017) highlights 
that: lone-parent families continue to experience a disproportionate level of poverty 
with the rate of consistent poverty at 24.6 per cent for lone parents compared to 6.4 
per cent for two-parent families, consistent poverty is experience by those who have 
an income of less than 60 per cent of the national median income and who cannot 
afford at least two of the 11 deprivation indicators.3 The ‘at risk of poverty’ rate was 
40.2 per cent for lone parents compared to 12 per cent for two-parent families, 
that is, those who have an income of less than 60 per cent of the national median 
income. In relation to deprivation, for lone parents the rate was 50.1 per cent in 2016 
compared to 6.4 per cent for two-parent families, material or enforced deprivation 
is measured by those who cannot afford two of the 11 deprivation indicators (CSO, 
2017). Of all Irish lone parents, 40.8 per cent have very low-levels of education and 
have not completed secondary level education (CSO, 2012). As a result, those who 
are attached to the labour market tend to work in low-skilled areas with consequent 
low pay (Watson et al, 2011).
Lone parents in receipt of OFP constitute a comparatively small group in Irish 
society. Prior to the policy change, in 2010 there were 92,326 recipients of OFP, 49 
per cent of whom were in paid employment and in receipt of an income disregard 
(CSO, 2012) at a time when there was an unemployment rate of 13.8 per cent. While 
proposals for lone-parent activation have been in the policy domain since 2006 (see 
Millar and Crosse, 2018), the decision to implement labour market activation for 
Irish lone parents was made in the context of commitments made under the Troika 
bailout (the three-year economic rescue programme implemented by the International 
Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the European Union (see Hick, 2018). 
The policy was framed in terms of savings to be made in the context of reforming 
social protection, moving from a contingency-structured regime to one that identifies 
claimants by reference to their relationship with the labour market. Claimants are 
simply young, old, or ‘working age’, resulting in an individualised social protection 
system with no reference to the caring obligations of lone parents. 
These changes meant that the age threshold of the youngest child would be reduced 
from 18 to 7 over a phased period, those who no longer qualified for OFP would 
instead claim Jobseeker’s Allowance (JA) and must be genuinely seeking work. Since 
2012, 43,500 OFP recipients have exited the scheme. Those with children aged over 
14 are required to be available and genuinely seeking full-time employment if they 
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are in receipt of JA. However, those OFP recipients with children aged 7–14 are 
exempt from having to be available for full-time employment but they are obliged 
to engage with the DSP’s activation services and receive a JST. Prior to the policy 
change under an earnings disregard scheme, those in receipt OFP could earn €147 
per week and still qualify for the full rate of OFP payment. Half the remainder of 
gross earnings up to €425 per week was assessed as means. The reforms included a 
reduction in the earnings disregard for OFP from €147 per week to €90 in 2014 
with the intention to reduce the disregard to €60 but this was reversed in 2017 when 
it was increased by €20 and again in 2018. There are differing options available for 
lone parents to combine social protection and earnings: 
1. Those with children younger than 7 can combine OFP and the earnings disregard.
2. Those with children younger than 7 can combine OFP and FIS.
3. Those with children aged 7–14 can combine JST and the earnings disregard. 
4. Those with children aged 14 and over can combine paid employment with FIS.
The most financially beneficial option is dependent on income thresholds, means, 
age of child and number of children in the family unit. 
Those who were in employment and in receipt of OFP are entitled to apply for 
FIS and the BTWFD. The BTWFD is a time limited weekly payment for parents 
who move from social protection into employment or self-employment. For each 
qualified child (up to a maximum of four children), €29.80 is paid for the first year 
in employment. Half that amount will be paid in the second year (Millar and Crosse, 
2016; 2018). FIS is Ireland’s IWB introduced in 1984 to compensate for the abolition 
of food subsidies, to preserve the incentive either to remain in employment or to 
‘move from welfare dependence to employment’, and to provide a temporary solution 
to low-income pending the reform of child income support. However, such planned 
reform did not transpire and FIS has remained as a targeted support for low-income 
families (DSP, 2010, 39). When FIS was introduced, fewer than 10 per cent of families 
in Ireland were headed by lone parents (Fahey and Field, 2008, 42), compared to 18 
per cent of family units in 2016 (CSO, 2017, 38). This was at a time when there was 
no requirement on lone parents in receipt of social protection to be in employment. 
However, in 2014, lone parents accounted for almost half of all families in receipt of 
FIS as is evident in Figure 1.
FIS is a weekly tax-free payment for all families, where one or both parents are 
working a minimum of 38 hours over a two-week period, and where earnings are 
less than specific limits set for family size. FIS payments are a minimum of €20 per 
week and a maximum of 60 per cent of the difference between the family’s average 
weekly income and the limit. Table 1 is an example taken from the DSP website of 
a FIS calculation (see Table 1). 
Murphy (2012) argues that FIS might not be suitable for all individuals, particularly 
those in precarious employment. Irish women are more likely to work in low-paid, 
part-time precarious work. Precarious hours and short-term seasonal contracts are 
prevalent in sectors such as tourism or retail (Murphy, 2012) and many lone parents opt 
to work in these sectors (McGinnity et al, 2014, 41) as local employment is necessary 
for them to fulfil their roles as carer and earner. FIS payments are calculated annually 
and if a recipient has their wages or their hours of work reduced during the year, 
their FIS payment will remain the same until the next review. However, if the hours 
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Figure 1: Number of one and two parent families receiving FIS in Ireland, 2003–2014
Note: Available at www.welfare.ie/en/Pages/Annual-SWS-Statistical-Information-Report-2015.aspx.  
Source: Department of Social Protection Annual Statistical Information Reports.1 (DSP, 2017)
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Table 1: FIS payment for lone-parent, 1 child, recently commenced working 25 hours per 
week 
Gross taxable earnings to date €360.00
Total tax deducted €0.00
Employee Pay Related Social Insurance €14.40
Total Universal Social Charge €10.54
Net assessable earnings €335.06
Number of weeks worked 1
Average weekly earnings €335.06
Other Income €0.00
Total family income €335.06
Income limit (1 Child) €511.00
Difference between income limit and earnings €175.94
FIS Payable (60% of difference rounded)         €106.00
 
Source: DSP, 2018
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worked fall below the FIS threshold of 38 hours per fortnight or if their employment 
ceases, they are no longer entitled to FIS and the payment ends. Furthermore, those 
returning to employment on a contract without fixed hours may be unable to provide 
proof of working 19 hours a week to qualify for FIS. It is argued that there is low 
take-up of FIS by eligible families, with some estimates that only 40 per cent of those 
eligible are in receipt of FIS (ECPC, 2013; Savage et al, 2017). 
Since 2015, advocacy and support groups raised concern that many lone parents 
would be financially worse off due to their move from OFP to JA and FIS. Single 
Parents Acting for the Rights of Our Kids (SPARK) and One Family presented 
concerns to the Joint Committee on Education and Social Protection of the Houses 
of the Oireachtas in February 2015. SPARK reported that lone parents moving to 
FIS will lose their fuel allowance of €520 annually and 40 per cent of their current 
OFP as a result of the policy change to the OFP (Bayliss, Oireachtas Debates, 
18/02/2015). In 2017, SPARK reported to the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Social 
Protection (JOCSP) that a lone parent earning €210 with one child and receiving €75 
maintenance will be over €50 per week better off if they come off FIS and return to 
JST (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2017, 38). An example of the impact of the reform 
on a lone parent who had been working part time, in receipt of both OFP and FIS 
is presented in Table 2, the lone parent has been moved from OFP and FIS, to FIS 
alone which has resulted in a reduction of €41.20 a week including the fuel allowance. 
The JOCSP reported that since 2012, 43,500 parents exited the OPF scheme and 
3,000 lone parents became new FIS recipients by the end of 2015 (Houses of the 
Oireachtas, 2017, 38). While this figure does not explain the situation in its entirety 
this means that only 6.9 per cent of those who transitioned were moved to the IWB:
The small proportion of the total accounted for here may be the beginning 
of a trend whereby lone parents are transitioning into employment having left 
the scheme or, it may be a reflection of improved economic circumstances 
in general. Whatever the reason it seems obvious that further evidence needs 
to be gathered before the outcome of the changes can be seen. (Houses of 
the Oireachtas, 2017, 38)
Table 2: Impact of the OFP Reform on a lone-parent working part-time
Income Before OFP Reform € Income After OFP Reform €
OFP 182.00 OFP 0.00
Earned income 173.00 Earned income 173.00
FIS 91.00 FIS 202.00
Maintenance 0.00 Maintenance 0.00
BTFWD - BTFWD 29.80
Fuel allowance 20.00 Fuel allowance 0.00
Total 466.60 Total 404.80
 
Source: One Family, 2015
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Considering the poverty statistics in relation to lone parents, however, it is doubtful 
that they are experiencing ‘improved economic circumstances’. Data from the report 
commissioned by the DSP highlight that 48 per cent of individuals who exited OFP 
in 2015 had their income reduced. Those who exited in 2016 had their income remain 
the same and the authors suggest that this may be due to differences between the 
2015 and 2016 groups such as parental age and age of children. They conclude that 
‘it is too early to make definitive conclusions on the impact of the policy changes in 
incomes in the medium term’ (Indecon, 2017, 56). However, they report that for all 
those who have exited OFP 53 per cent of lone parents reported being financially 
worse off since the reforms and 63 per cent of those in full-time employment cannot 
afford three or more items on the deprivation list (Indecon, 2017). These employed 
lone parents are experiencing ‘in-work’ poverty and daily deprivation. 
Findings 
As stated above, the findings in this paper draw from two studies funded by the 
DSP and IRC. The first study (Millar and Crosse, 2016) hereafter referred to as the 
‘Activation and Inclusion Study’ (AIS) is based on research commissioned by the 
Social Inclusion Division in the DSP in November 2014 and was funded by the IRC. 
The data utilised in AIS was collected from 20 semi-structured qualitative interviews 
with policy actors, organisations representing those parenting alone, community 
and voluntary organisations working with those parenting alone and state bodies 
involved in the activation of lone parents and focused on capturing the participants’ 
knowledge and expertise regarding activation of lone parents, as well as their views 
on what activation measures and supports work best for lone parents in the Irish 
context. By engaging with organisations that work with lone parents, the research 
is grounded in tangible evidence from those with the knowledge and expertise to 
consider activation in the Irish context. 
The second study (Gray and Rooney, 2018), hereafter referred to as the ‘Enabling 
Resilience Study’ (ERS), investigated the experiences of low-income families receiving 
FIS. This study was funded by the IRC in collaboration with the DSP. The present 
analysis is based on the subset of participants in ERS who are lone parents. Overall 
30 parents and guardians receiving FIS were biographically interviewed of whom 13 
were lone parents. Participants were living in the Midlands Region of Ireland, which 
experienced considerable population growth during Ireland’s economic boom and 
subsequent high increases in rates of unemployment and mortgage arrears following 
Ireland’s financial crisis. Interviews were analysed using thematic framework analysis. 
Ethical approval for ERS was granted by the Maynooth University Ethics Committee. 
The analysis here centres on the experiences of the 13 lone parent respondents in 
ERS. These participants were aged 35 to 67 years, and most were Irish (two were 
from other European states). Two received both FIS and OFP as they have children 
aged less than 7 years. One was a voluntary guardian and 11 had previously received 
OFP when their children were aged less than 7.
Data from both studies were combined using qualitative synthesis, which is used to 
amalgamate a body of research about a topic (Hannes and Lockwood, 2012; Ring, et 
al, 2010). A variation of meta-ethnography developed by Noblit and Hare (1988) was 
used to compare, analyse and further interpret results. Overarching themes were used 
to establish differences and similarities that existed between both datasets. We followed 
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seven steps as outlined by Noblit and Hare (1988) to establish an overall picture of FIS 
from both the experiences of FIS recipients (ERS) and key stakeholders (AIS) (Table 
3). The first four steps focus on selecting and determining appropriate studies. Steps 
five to seven focus on translating, synthesising and reporting data from both studies. 
Favourable aspects of FIS
In this section, the findings from the two studies funded by DSP and IRC are 
presented. Findings are conceptualised into three core themes (Table 4). Lone parents in 
ERS described the positive aspects of receiving IWBs and explained how FIS enabled 
them to meet basic needs and move towards a greater level of financial independence. 
Participants described the importance of IWBs to working lone parents in enabling 
them to meet their basic needs: 
I wouldn’t be as comfortable as I am without my social welfare payments 
because…the majority of my wages goes on my rent…so the balance that 
is left over from both my payments (BTWFD and FIS) would be for my 
bills and shopping. (Caitriona)
Table 3: Seven steps of meta-ethnography 
Steps Description 
Getting started
Deciding what is relevant to the initial interest Selecting appropriate studies 
Reading the studies Reviewing the studies 
Determining how the studies are related Searching for common concepts between studies
Translating the studies into one another Creating a grid to compare studies 
Synthesising translations Developing a relationship between concepts
Expressing the synthesis Reporting the synthesis 
Source: Adapted from Noblit and Hare, 1988
Table 4: Super ordinate and sub-themes
Core theme Theme Sub-theme
Favourable aspects Dignity Meeting basic needs 
Financial independence
Less stigma
Negative experiences Rules pertaining to FIS payments Annual review of FIS
Low-hour contracts and precarious 
working arrangements
Employer’s role in FIS process
Changes in income
Thoughts on FIS FIS as a stepping stone/part of a package 
of support
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Participants noted that while payments are small they go towards the purchase of food 
or products that benefited their children. Recipients described the contrast between 
struggling to make ends meet before and after they received FIS: 
It was like somebody taking a big weight off my shoulders…I remember 
going in and filling the fridge full of food and buying the kids’ clothes. (Edel)
Some participants described living in substandard conditions and receiving food 
from employers prior to applying for FIS. Others asserted that FIS enabled them to 
live week-to-week. FIS was highlighted as an incentive for part-time workers such 
as Aisling who would be unable to work part time without FIS, due to the cost of 
commuting. It also afforded her the opportunity to progress in her career: 
FIS really makes a huge difference…when you are not as stressed about 
money…you start to think more about your career. (Aisling) 
For those whose children required childminding, FIS enabled them to work part time 
and care for their families outside of school hours. Some parents had been financially 
reliant on partners prior to separation and FIS enabled them to start working for the 
first time in years and become financially independent. 
My husband would have paid for everything, he organised mortgage, car 
insurance holidays, everything…I went to my employer…he would have 
known the situation I was in then…I was saying to him ‘You know if full-
time work is available I’ll come and work full-time.’ (Catriona) 
The lone parents appreciated that FIS is paid weekly and maintained that it provided 
them with a sense of security:
FIS is so important because you know that…that money is going to be there 
every Thursday, at least there is that. (Denise) 
Lone parents in ERS felt that there is less stigma associated with receiving FIS as 
opposed to other social protection payments as FIS is processed by direct debit rather 
than being collected in person at the post office:
FIS means a huge amount to me. It allowed me to keep my dignity because…
nobody knows I’m getting FIS. (Christina) 
However, while FIS was viewed as a more private payment than JA, some parents still 
associated FIS with social stigma. Parents expressed a desire to leave social welfare 
protection and some therefore delayed entering the FIS system. In Orla’s case she 
was originally working part time and although she was earning low wages, she felt 
uncomfortable about applying for state assistance:
I kind of didn’t want to depend too much on social welfare and I never 
really bothered looking into FIS. (Orla) 
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Negative aspects of FIS
Several negative issues associated with the FIS payment emerged from the ERS 
interviews with lone parents: the annual review of the payment; the issue of non-fixed 
and low-hour contracts; precarious working arrangements; loss of income as result 
of lone-parent activation, as well as the employer’s role in securing FIS. The annual 
renewal process was a considerable issue for interviewees in ERS. This was particularly 
so for participants whose wages were reduced and in the case of an interviewee who 
had received a one-off work bonus payment before her annual re-assessment. Once 
recipients are accepted for FIS, their payment continues for 52 weeks. FIS payments 
are not affected by increasing or decreasing wages until the annual review, whereby 
a recipient can re-apply giving details of their new reduced income. At the end of 
the 52-week period, a recipient can re-apply for next year. However, payments are 
affected if recipients lose their job, their hours are reduced below the minimum 38 
hours per fortnight, they have another child during the year, or their OFP ceased due 
to the age of their youngest child. If they lose their job they are no longer entitled 
to FIS and in both cases the DSP must be notified immediately.
In the case of the lone-parent activation policy, however, the DSP decided that 
lone parents moving off OFP did not have to wait the required 52 weeks for their 
FIS payments to be reviewed to take account of the changes as explained by a 
policymaker in AIS:
Usually FIS is reviewed annually, and it’s set in stone so irrespective of your 
personal circumstances with the exception of a new child your FIS payment 
isn’t adjusted. So, in 2013 we changed that for lone parents who were affected 
specifically by this transition so that FIS, even though it’s not their annual 
review, will be automatically increased to take account of 60 per cent of the 
loss of their OFP. Now what that means overall is they’re still down because 
they’re going to lose 40 per cent of OFP but without that they will have 
lost 100 per cent of OFP. (Policymaker 1)
Lone parents in ERS also discussed the impact of the 52-week renewal feature of 
FIS on their lives. Orla and Denise who have mandatory unpaid leave each year, 
found this aspect punitive for them. Orla is a seasonal worker employed from March 
to November. Denise is required by her employer to take three weeks unpaid leave 
each year and then collects JA for three weeks. Therefore, she must cancel and reapply 
for FIS each year, resulting in a period where does not receive a wage or a social 
protection payment resulting in misalignments between payments each year:
The mess up when…every year there is a recurring lay off. To at least be 
sure while they are sorting out the bank, the JA, that at least leave you that. 
Do you know? But as soon as they start to process your claim they stop, the 
FIS stops. Then you have nothing and then you must get the JA and then…
there is nothing coming in, then I go back to work we’ll get paid…we’ll get 
one-week’s wages when we go back to work, and the JA will probably come 
through then and then you have to go back and reapply for FIS. (Denise)
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In line with this, lone parents whose circumstances changed were required to wait 
until the end of their FIS year to have their claim reassessed. Sandra felt that this 
aspect of FIS should be readdressed:
I think really if your circumstances change, that should be taken into account. 
(Sandra)
The fact that reviews are conducted annually, however, can work to the benefit of 
those recipients whose income has increased as their FIS payment won’t be cut until 
the next review. 
Many parents suggested that there were challenges associated with filling out 
paperwork. Often participants filled out similar forms for more than one social 
welfare payment. Margaret noted that she was asked to send the same documents to 
the department on more than one occasion. Aisling found the process frustrating:
It’s frustrating when it comes to all the information that they are looking 
for. It’s all repeated information. (Aisling) 
To qualify for FIS payment a recipient must work 38 or more hours per fortnight (or 
19 hours per week). If the number of weekly hours worked by a recipient is reduced to 
below 38 hours per fortnight they are no longer entitled to FIS. The lack of flexibility 
on the hour’s criteria can be an issue for some lone parents. Respondents in AIS also 
highlighted the challenges associate with meeting the criterion for number of hours:
A flexibility around the 19 hours; if your job will only give you 16 hours; 
you’ve obviously shown your willingness to activate, you know. (Activist 1)
 For others, the lack of flexibility in the hour’s criteria is not conducive to real life 
circumstances and is restraining as one stakeholder in AIS explains: 
You’re not entitled to FIS because you’re not doing 19 hours; you’re only 
doing 15 hours. They’re putting ridiculous restraints on people, ridiculous; 
that are not realistic. You have to look at each case in and of its own and 
look at how you can flex things to support that family. You can’t just stick a 
framework onto people, life isn’t like that. (Voluntary Sector 1) 
In a similar vein, the reality of trying to secure 19 hours was highlighted by other 
respondents in AIS as an issue, with the point being that it is difficult to demand 19 
hours from any employer:
We’re aware people don’t have the 19 hours and they’re not making it to 
the FIS, the eligibility for that has to change. Why not encourage them to 
take the 10 hours, take the 8 hours? Take them; we’ll give you part-time 
scheme. Just take something to get yourself moving…That 19-hours FIS 
I think, this criteria has to change; it has to match where people are, it has 
to match the economy…it’s not within the gift of an employee to demand 
19 hours. (Activist 2) 
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The issue of the qualifying criteria for receipt of FIS is further exacerbated by the 
prevalence of ‘if and when’ and other precarious contracts. There is no guarantee of 
securing the consistent 19 hours per week required to qualify for and maintain the 
FIS payment while on this type of contract. While those in the policy arena accept 
that this is a problem, and maintain that work is ongoing to address it, they believe 
that there is a limit to what can be achieved, as explained by one policy actor in AIS: 
I’m surprised on a personal level zero-hour contracts haven’t been a much 
bigger issue over recent years…But at the end of the day we won’t be able 
to force an employer to increase hours. We’re definitely trying to make 
them aware just how beneficial getting up to 19 hours is…Most employers 
are reasonable, and they’ll assist their employees if needs be. (Policymaker1) 
Other respondents in AIS suggested that employers should be more aware of the 
circumstances of employees in this situation: 
There’s a major piece of work to be done with the employer on understanding 
social welfare because that’s not the remit of an employer. An employer is 
offering hours and he’s not responsible for how you’re treated or affected 
by social welfare.…to explain to them ‘Well, if you gave Barbra 19 hours 
you’re actually increasing her salary by this.’ (Advocate 2)
When discussing precarious contracts, respondents in ERS questioned the 19-hours’ 
threshold and maintained that it was difficult for some lone parents to obtain enough 
work to qualify for FIS. Aisling described how she was offered a job with a low-hour 
contract after losing her job. It was not possible for her to accept employment for 
four hours a day due to the cost of commuting: 
You do four-hour shifts…which would not suit me at all…I was thinking 
of the travelling. (Aisling)
In relation to the hour’s threshold, retail workers such as Vika in ERS noted that it 
was difficult to predict her hours. Therefore, she was unsure if she would qualify for 
FIS next year:
I have trouble working out what I have because my hours is different from 
one week…I have one week 15, second one is 30, then I have a 14 you 
know?…I know that the FIS is supposed to be…19 hours…but I sometimes 
I don’t have that. (Vika)
In AIS two specific issues were raised in relation to the employer’s role in securing 
a FIS payment for an employee. The first relates to privacy. The fact that employers 
must sign off on a FIS application means that they are aware of their employee’s need 
for a DSP payment, which may be a contentious issue for the employee, due to the 
lack of privacy around their personal circumstances. The second issue concerns the 
burden on the employer due to the necessity for paperwork. This is something that 
those in the policy arena are aware of as highlighted by policy actors in AIS:
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A key issue is people (a) don’t want their employers to know that they need 
social welfare support or (b) are afraid to go to the employers and say ‘Fill 
out this form’ and employers are saying ‘Not another bloody form’, you 
know. (Policymaker 1) 
Those who advocate on behalf of lone parents also highlighted this issue. The amount 
of paperwork for the employer has increased due to the necessity for accompanying 
letters to be included with the application.
I’ve heard a lot of people saying, a lot of people who have increased their 
hours to the 19 hours, firstly they had to sign section 8 of the FIS form and 
your employer has to sign it. There are a few cases I know now, the employer 
has signed that, the form has gone in and FIS was refused because well we 
needed a letter as well. So now to get FIS you now need to fill in the section 
8 and the employer has to send a letter as well. (Advocate 1)
Moreover, as stakeholders in AIS explain the requirement of an employer to fill out 
forms for social protection payments puts recipients in a weaker position in terms of 
being able to secure and maintain jobs. Due to the inconvenience of the paperwork 
involved, it might be easier for employers to employ those with no such requirements:
It’s bureaucratic and it’s also putting up a barrier because an employer has 
a worker who doesn’t need all this signed or one who has to get all these 
forms signed. (Advocate 1)
There is a significant concern that the transition from OFP to FIS has resulted in a 
reduction in income for some, particularly those who were already in employment. 
In AIS those in the policy arena acknowledge such losses:
The big area to come up is those already in employment and the impact 
the reform is going to have on them moving off OFP. Depending on the 
circumstances but yes there can be losses. Some of those losses can be 
significant per week. (Policymaker1)
Other policymakers while acknowledging possible income losses expressed the view 
that such losses are marginal and could be remedied by increasing hours of work: 
I suppose some people are going to fall through the cracks. But I know that 
the jobseeker payments teams and the FIS teams are looking at it…but I 
suppose there will be some people who would lose out marginally. I think 
they’re saying to those people you can increase your hours slightly and still 
get your FIS, where feasible. (Policymaker 2) 
Lone-parent advocates in AIS are of the view that losses in income because of 
activation were substantial and particularly more so when entitlement to the BTWFD 
runs out, following the lone parents’ second year of employment: 
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The first thing is the loss of income; a minimum wage worker working 19 
hours a week will be down €78 a week by July and that’ll rise to €108 by 
the time they lose BTWFD, so €108 a week on a lone parent working 19 
hours. That’s obviously not viable. It’s that shocking, its €108 for somebody 
working 19 hours, doing everything the Department has said, working the 
hours to get FIS, one child and they’re going to be down €108. (Advocate 2)
Going on to explain the details of such losses, advocacy groups maintain that changes 
to income disregard since 2012, the fact that FIS only replaces 60 per cent of OFP, 
loss of fuel allowance because of uptake of FIS and eventual loss of the BTWFD all 
culminate in the loss of €108 per week for some lone parents: 
The income disregard means every working lone parent who earned over €90 
has lost €28 because of income disregard, going from €147.60 to €90. That 
was €57.60 divide by two is your €28…So, we’ve all lost that cumulatively 
since 2012. Then it’s €50 a working lone parent on minimum wage loses 
because if you look at the way FIS and OFP, FIS replaces 60 per cent of your 
OFP. The perverse thing about that is those earning less needed OFP more, 
would have had a high OFP so for them to lose 40 per cent of OFP, they’re 
the poorest…It’s the perverse thing about these changes; that the lower you 
earned the worse you’re affected. Fuel allowance as well, because on OFP 
you were allowed fuel allowance and you’re not allowed it on FIS…getting 
the €29.80 BTWFD but you’re losing €10 a week from the fuel allowance 
anyway so it’s still only, €20. (Activist 2)
Lone-parent interviewees in ERS described how they suffered from a loss of income 
following the transition from OFP to FIS. Orla described the impact of transition 
on her life: 
OFP would have been slashed or stopped because of John being a certain 
age…I was down something like €75 a-week which is huge. (Orla) 
Orla lost her entitlement to fuel allowance after the transition which affected her as a 
seasonal worker, as she is unemployed during the winter. She felt misled and suggested 
that working lone parents were disadvantaged by changes to OFP:
You know, and you are allocated a fuel allowance. When I was on OFP it was 
automatic and that was €20 a week…But that stopped when OFP stopped 
or whatever system I went on…they wouldn’t allow fuel allowance.
Margaret believed that removing OFP, once a recipient’s child reached 7 years of age, 
should be reviewed. She maintained that the financial costs associated with raising a 
child over the age of 7 are high: 
I find it harder, there is more demands, he needs more stuff and like he’s in 
national school now. (Margaret) 
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While we have seen the potential of the changes to OFP to result in significant losses 
in income, it is worth noting that those in the policy arena are of the view that there 
have been significant gains in income because of lone parents transitioning to the 
FIS payment: 
If someone wasn’t on FIS and goes from OFP and claims FIS and BTWFD 
the increases can be very, very significant. If they are working or they 
can get up to 19 hours, it’s so much more financially beneficial for them. 
(Policymaker 1)
In the ERS study, some parents who transitioned from OPF to FIS found that there 
was financially little difference between both payments:
I didn’t see any difference. Except for the name and I don’t understand why 
they did it. (Margaret)
It had a profoundly negative impact for Áine, however. Her payment was reduced 
following the transition and she was anxious about paying bills: 
Last year my son was 7 so I lost my OFP which [meant] I was down €160 
a week. So, the way I was led to believe that no one was going to be down 
anything…just…FIS took it over and gave you the difference. That’s what 
I was led to believe; it was not like that at all. (Áine)
FIS was viewed as a stepping-stone to a full transition from welfare to work by those 
in the policy arena. Policy actors in AIS explain: 
Ideally you want people [getting] into very well-paid employment but it’s 
going to be a long process for a lot of these individuals and you have to 
be realistic about that as well. Financially the best thing for a working lone 
parent if they’re in receipt of OFP is to get on FIS and that’s the message 
we’re pushing. Now do we want them to be on FIS forever? Absolutely 
not, we want them to get a better job, better paid job that gets them out 
of welfare. But it’s definitely a step in the right direction. (Policymaker 1) 
FIS is only one part of a package of supports that the DSP has put together to support 
people to take up employment, such as BTWFD and the Housing Assistance Payment 
(HAP). A civil servant in the DSP stated that although FIS is supportive, it is not perfect: 
We will support the employee, through FIS, BTWFD; hopefully HAP if 
they’re in receipt of HAP and the medical card. That’s a strong package and 
it addresses a lot of the big fears people have. Now is it complete? No. And 
can it be improved on? Yes. But it is there as a basis for us into the future. 
I think what’ll happen is probably hopefully as the economy continues to 
pick up and our jobseekers numbers decline we’ll be left with a group of 
jobseekers and we’ll be able to probably tailor supports to the harder to 
move. (Policymaker 2)
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Discussion
In line with other countries, Ireland has been moving away from a breadwinner 
model of labour market participation to a dual-earner model. Especially in the 
context of reforms introduced under the Troika, state support for labour market 
participation has shifted to an adult worker model, with notable consequences for 
lone parents, who previously were not subjected to labour activation measures. This 
paper makes a significant contribution to the research area of lone-parent activation 
and the utilisation of IWBs in that process. International research suggests that there 
are a wide variety of IWBs available in other jurisdictions, some of which have been 
shown to be successful in providing income adequacy to lone-parent recipients (Ray 
et al, 2007; Casebourne et al, 2010). In many countries ‘making work pay’ policies 
have contributed to an increase in employment and a reduction in poverty in lone-
parent families (Verbist et al, 2007). While findings from this study show that, in some 
instances, FIS is effective in assisting lone-parent recipients to meet basic needs, key 
issues remain both in relation to the success of FIS as an activation support and in its 
application. Such issues raise questions about the capacity of FIS in its current form 
to provide income adequacy for many lone parents in Ireland. 
It has been argued that FIS, as it currently operates, might not be suitable for all 
individuals returning to employment, particularly those in precarious employment 
(Murphy, 2012). Many lone parents are in low-paid, low-skilled and part-time 
precarious employment (Watson et al, 2011; Murphy, 2012) in the retail and tourism 
sectors as local employment is necessary for them to fulfil their roles as carer and 
earner. Findings from this study provide some support for these assertions. Several lone 
parents interviewed for ERS are engaged in precarious employment characterised 
by seasonal work, or by temporary or low-hour contracts. Lone parents describe 
working in roles with no specified hours of work, and no guarantee of the consistent 
19 hours of work per week required to meet the qualifying criteria for FIS. These 
types of working environments can lead to precarious conditions, as described by 
lone parents in ERS, such as unstable income, along with difficulties managing work 
and family life. Such employer’s practices are questionable, however, stakeholders in 
AIS contend that this is a difficult issue to resolve as the onus is on employers to set 
hours of work. While there are plans to implement legislation to regulate precarious 
employment, the impact of these measures remains uncertain. Furthermore, seasonal 
employment runs contrary to the intentions of FIS, which aims to promote stable 
and continuous employment.
The initial intention of the introduction of FIS as an IWB in Ireland was to 
provide a temporary solution to low income among families with children. While the 
findings from this qualitative study are limited and do not purport to be the case for 
all lone parents, in the context of more vigorous measures to activate labour market 
participation, moving lone parents from OFP to JA and FIS has resulted in some 
of them being financially worse off. Lone-parent advocacy groups have presented 
evidence to the Houses of the Oireachtas that the cumulative effects of the changes 
have resulted in reductions in income for many who have transitioned to FIS (Bayliss, 
Oireachtas Debates, 18/02/2015). The experiences of many lone parents in ERS are 
consistent with these assertions, with participants highlighting a range of reductions 
in income. Such losses were also recognised by expert informants within the policy 
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arena in AIS, who acknowledged ‘significant losses’ per week among those who were 
already on limited hours of employment prior to the policy change. 
As outlined earlier in this paper, evidence from other jurisdictions shows that tax 
credits and IWBs are significant in assisting with the transition from welfare to work. 
Overall, the research suggests that IWBs are a successful way to improve quality of 
life and reduce child poverty in lone-parent families (Brewer et al, 2012; Carnochan 
et al, 2005). This study provides a collation of evidence from two studies funded by 
the DSP and the IRC examining both what works in lone-parent activation and the 
experiences of low-income families in receipt of FIS. While the evidence suggests that 
FIS acts as a valuable support for employment among some lone parents, there are 
also difficulties with FIS as an IWB. These include: challenges arising from the yearly 
review and the employer’s role in the process. However, it is the lack of capacity of 
the payment to deal with issues of precarious employment and reductions in income 
that are of fundamental concern to some lone parents. 
In line with the adult ‘making work pay’ philosophy, policy actors in this study 
express the view that FIS is a stepping stone to a full transition from welfare to work. 
As stated previously, Irish lone parents have low levels of educational attainment and 
those who are attached to the labour market tend to work in low-skilled areas with 
consequent low pay. These features, combined with caring responsibilities which 
preclude many from engaging in full-time employment, have resulted in lone parents 
continuing to have a higher risk of poverty and deprivation than that of the general 
population. Therefore, it is doubtful that a ‘making work pay’ approach which utilises 
FIS as an IWB to increase the labour force participation of lone parents without 
addressing the quality of employment or reductions in income evidenced in this 
study will be effective. Our findings therefore encourage a rethinking of the current 
system, which requires either significant changes or the introduction of a modified 
IWB system. 
This leads us to question how policy-makers can resolve the negative aspects 
associated with FIS. Issues such as proving hours worked, employer power and the 
annual review could be negated by the proposed reform for the Office of the Revenue 
Commissioners to collect real-time information from employers regarding earnings 
and possibly hours worked for all employees which would allow for the automatic 
award of in-work benefits (Savage et al, 2017). One Family (2017) recommend 
lowering the 19 the hours limit to 15 in recognition of the difficulties lone parents 
face in balancing work and care. However, this could result in employers responding 
in lowering the hours of work they offer to FIS recipients, not all of whom might 
wish to have their hours reduced. Alternatively, a move towards the introduction of 
a tax credit system would provide a stable and secure payment for all lone parents in 
employment and if real-time information on earnings is available it would negate the 
issue of hours worked as required by FIS. The effectiveness of such a system would, 
however, be dependent on real-time information on earnings being available and 
the flexibility of the DSP to respond to changes in earnings in a timely manner so 
as not have those in receipt of a tax credit under- or overpaid for an unreasonable 
length of time. 
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Conclusion
Lone-parent activation in Ireland has been postulated as a solution to high poverty 
rates experienced by these families. While the international literature does suggest 
that IWBs can assist lone parents in making the transition to work as part of an 
activation policy and are a successful way of improving quality of life and reducing 
child poverty in lone-parent families, data from the two studies brought together 
in this paper, together with official statistics on the uptake of FIS by activated lone 
parents show that Ireland’s IWB does not work for all in its current form. Participants 
in these studies describe situations where lone parents are financially less well-off 
because of being in employment and receiving FIS, as opposed to OFP. While policy 
actors acknowledge significant losses in income in some cases, FIS is still regarded as 
financially the best support for a working lone parent. 
FIS can support lone parents through the initial move from benefits to employment 
by ensuring a reliable weekly income while adapting to budgeting on a wage and by 
offering additional income. However, FIS was designed 33 years ago as an IWB for 
low-income families, with two parents in mind, at a time when there was no work 
requirement on lone parents in receipt of social protection. The capacity of a lone 
parent to work and care cannot be compared to that of a two-parent family and, as 
such, an IWB designed with two parents in mind requires modification. FIS has the 
potential to protect lone parents from a loss of income. Removing or creating flexibility 
in relation to the hours requirement for a limited period (at a minimum) would enable 
lone parents to make the transition to employment as it would facilitate part-time and 
seasonal employment, create income adequacy and encourage work–family balance. 
Notes
1 FIS was renamed the Working Family Payment in January 2018.
2  The IWC is a non-conventional IWB, as it was aimed specifically at lone parents, it had 
a 12-month time limit, and entitlement was conditional on previous receipt of welfare 
(Brewer et al, 2012). The IWC is no longer available. 
3  The 11 deprivation indictors are two pairs of strong shoes, a warm waterproof overcoat, 
buy new not second-hand clothes, eat meals with meat, chicken, fish or vegetarian 
equivalent every second day, have a roast joint or its equivalent once a week, had to go 
without heating during the last year through lack of money, keeps the home adequately 
warm, buy presents for family or friends at least once a year, replace any worn out furniture, 
have family or friends for a drink or meal once a month, have a morning, afternoon or 
evening out in the last fortnight for entertainment. 
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